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31.  INTRODUCTION
We live in a world undergoing an information revolution. As the world
becomes smaller and smaller through the development of information networks
including the internet, the ownership of cutting-edge information and communication
technologies is rapidly becoming a factor of primary importance in both gaining, and
maintaining a position in the forefront of the international political economy.
The semiconductor industry has been termed 'the crude oil of the information
era', a graphic symbolization of the importance of semiconductor devices as an
essential component of information and communications equipment. An increasing
proportion of contemporary manufactured products, from consumer electronics to
industrial robots, from consumer durables to smart missiles, without their silicone
‘brains’ would be useless. This implies that in the future the semiconductor industry
will increasingly serve in a bed-rock capacity, being the basis for the development of
virtually all other high-technology industries. Furthermore, it is clear that a wide
variety of semiconductors with varying levels of technological complexity are
required to meet the demand for not just high-technology goods but also increasingly
mundane consumer goods such as VCRs and calculators which rely on
semiconductors as well.
The semiconductor industry being characterized by varying levels of required
technology, afforded opportunities for some developing countries, especially Korea,
to overcome the high entrance barriers of the industry. South Korea has been
particularly successful in making a name in the world semiconductor market while
4many American and European semiconductor manufacturers, since the 1970s, have
disappeared without trace.
Starting from scratch, the Korean semiconductor industry was fostered in the
mid 1960s through the assembly of labour-intensive, low technology semiconductor
devices for multi-national companies (MNCs) from advanced countries, particularly
the United States of America and Japan. However, despite this rather inauspicious
start, by 1995 three Korean semiconductor firms (Samsung Electronics, LG
Electronics and Hyundai Electronics) came to be ranked amongst the world’s fifteen
top semiconductor producers. Currently, the Korean semiconductor industry is
dominated by Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Electronics following the merger of
LG Semiconductor with Hyundai in 1998.
From the very beginning of its semiconductor ‘leapfrogging’ phase which
began in 1983, Korea has placed heavy emphasis on the mass production of memory
chips. As of 1996, Korea controlled around 40% of the world DRAM market,
allowing Korea a share of the world DRAM market equal to that enjoyed by its
Japanese competitors. Korea possesses world-class DRAM production and process
technologies. Samsung Electronics, for instance, announced at the end of June 1999
the successful development of the world's first 1 Gb DDR SDRAM (Double Data
Rate Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory) at a press conference held at
its US-based production complex, Samsung Austin Semiconductor.
These achievements are a clear warning to developed countries of the
prospect of Korea becoming a world-beater in cutting-edge technologies in the
5coming information era.  It is therefore astonishing to note progress made by Korea’s
semiconductor industry, from a scratch starter to a world beater in less than fifteen
years. How has Korea managed to develop its semiconductor industry so successfully
in such a short period of time? What are the historical precedents which allowed
Korean firms such an advantage over international competitors? What effect did the
recent financial turmoil have on the industry, and what are the future prospects in the
wake of the economic crisis? It is the aim of this paper, using broad sources of
information, to firstly outline the historical background, recent economic and political
factors in an effort to provide answers to these questions.
2.  STATE INDUCEMENT OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (1965-72)
6In the early 1960s semiconductor producers from the United States were
seeking  skilled and relatively cheap labour in foreign countries. South Korea was an
ideal place for this purpose because of its highly skilled human resources, low wages,
and peaceful environment ensured by the authoritarian government. The first foreign
investment in the Korean semiconductor industry was made by the U.S. firm Komy,
in December 1965. Although the size of investment was relatively small, this was the
first important step in developing a domestic semiconductor manufacturing industry.
The first sizeable investment was made by Fairchild in 1969. At that time, it
was one of the largest semiconductor firms in the United States. Fairchild set two
preconditions : 100% ownership and free access to the domestic market. It was almost
impossible for the Korean government to satisfy these conditions due to existing
legislation on foreign investment .
The Fairchild conditions were discussed and reviewed by the Economic
Planning Board of Korea (EPB). The EPB decided to use its right to amend the
legislation governing foreign investment with the view to attract more foreign capital
and technologies in the future. Large foreign investment was crucial for the
government-devised plan to promote the domestic electronics industry. We can see
from this fact, that even laws and regulations were changed in order to create
favourable conditions for implementation of a government strategy to induce foreign
investment. As it was planned, many US semiconductor and electronics firms arrived
in Korea attracted by Fairchild’s success and established joint ventures as well as
exclusively owned firms (see table 2.1). Following the example of Toshiba in 1969,
Japanese companies joined this trend as well. (Hong 1997, 82-83)
7Table 2.1 - Foreign Investment in Korean Semiconductor Firms (1965-1973)
Approval
Date by the
EPB
Name of
Firm
Foreign
Investor
Country Investment
Amount
($1000)
Foreign
Ownership
(%)
Location
12.1965 KOMG KOMG USA 76 25 Seoul
4.1966 Semikor Fairchild USA 2250 100 Seoul
7.1966 Signetics Signetics USA 1750 100 Seoul
12.1966 Korea-Micro KMI USA 224 49 Seoul
3.1967 Motorola Motorola USA 8000 100 Seoul
7.1968 IMEC Komy USA 1210 100 Seoul
1.1969 Minsong Han-
American
USA 145 35 Seoul
7.1969 Toshiba Toshiba Japan 1400 70 Kumi
9.1969 Samsung-
Sanyo
Sanyo +
Sumitomo
Japan 1500 40 + 10 Seoul
3.1970 Taehan AMI USA 2264 100 Seoul
3.1970 Electrovoice EV USA 50 50 Kumi
7.1970 Varadyne Varadyne USA 294 49 Kumi
7.1970 Korea IC Tesco USA 700 50 Kumi
12.1970 Toko Toko Japan 390 100 MAFEZ
9.1971 KTK Toko Japan 100 MAFEZ
7.1972 Rohm Rohm Japan 95 Seoul
11.1972 Tokyo
Silicon
Sanyo Japan 1624 100 MAFEZ
5.1973 Sanken Sanken Japan 700 100 MAFEZ
Sources: Soh Changrok, September 1997
The creation of an electronics industrial complex was amongst the most
important objectives of the Electronics Industry Promotion Law. President Park was
personally involved in this issue. The Kumi Electronics Industrial complex was
officially opened in April 1970. The complex was granted numerous privileges and
government support in the form of infrastructure and facilities development. (Park, et
al 1987)
8Masan Free Export Zone (MAFEZ) was established together with the Kumi
Industrial Complex, following the instructions of the Korean government. The main
purpose of MAFEZ was to attract Japanese investment. The port of Masan in the
southern part of Korea was especially selected because of its geographical proximity
to Japan. As it was forethought by the government, Japanese capital dominated in
MAFEZ, and in 1974 it accounted for more than 90% in terms of number of foreign
companies as well as in terms of the size of total investment. (Lee Changrok 1974,
1212-1257)
MAFEZ serves as an example of the government’s desire to attract as much
foreign investment as possible. At the same time, it shows the great dependence of
Korean economy on imported capital. MAFEZ made clear the state attitude towards
foreign capital. The government evidently favoured joint ventures over to 100%
foreign owned enterprises. (Soh 1997, 221)
The Foreign Capital Inducement Law was enacted in 1969, providing
different types of incentives for foreign investment such as five year tax holidays,
duty-free imports of capital goods and raw materials, and 50 per cent income tax
reduction. It is worth noting that the Foreign Capital Inducement Law did not have
detailed instructions regarding foreign investment, stating that the process of foreign
direct investment should be regulated by the Economic Planning Board and the
related ministries, including the Ministry of Trade and Industry. (Yoon 1989, 50)
The Korean government continuously promoted the electronics industry even
during the periods of massive foreign investment inflow. The government’s
dedication to developing the electronics industry was announced by President Park in
9the 1967 ‘State of the Nation Address’. Professor Wan-Hee Kim of the Department of
Electrical Engineering at Columbia University was invited by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry in an effort to help promote the Korean electronics industry. Mr. Kim
prepared a report on the issue and submitted it to the president Park in September
1967.  The Scientific and Economic Council also prepared recommendations in
March 1967. Both recommendation packages, one by the Economic and Scientific
Council and the other by the MTI were almost identical and included the following
points:
- adoption of systematic industrial policies including the enactment of the
Electronics Industry Promotion Law;
- export promotion;
- long-term policies for the education of technical personnel;
- encouraging the chaebol to enter the electronics sector;
- various tax incentives;
- the establishment of the Electronics Industry Promotion Fund.
(EIAK 1989, 56-61)
These recommendations where again aimed at attracting foreign investment
and export promotion. In order for the industry to become more competitive in the
international market, the government tried to induce large conglomerates to enter the
electronics sector. Two chaebol, Taehan Electric Wire and Samsung, entered the
electronics industry in 1968 and 1969 respectively. One of the most important
milestones in the government’s vigorous efforts to promote the industry was the
enactment of the Electronics Industry Promotion Law in 1969. At the same time, The
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'Eight-Year plan for the Electronics Industry Promotion (1969-76)' was prepared by
the Ministry of Trade. This plan consisted of  the following three main points:
1) developing 95 major products;
2) exporting $400 million by 1976;
3) establishment of the 14 billion won Promotion Fund.
 (EIAK 1989, 76-82)
As a result of the these government efforts, the Korean semiconductor
industry grew rapidly reaching 5% of total exports by 1973.  The share of private
investment into the electronics industry sharply increased in response to the
government’s promotion strategy. The number of firms in the electronics sector in
1968 numbered 120 (115 domestic, 3 exclusively foreign subsidiaries, and 2 joint
ventures). (EIAK 1989, 40) It is obvious from this fact that despite of various
incentives by the Korean government to attract foreign investment into the electronics
industry, the government policies did not bring the desired results due to negative
attitude towards 100% foreign owned enterprises, and constraints in accessing the
domestic market. The situation in the semiconductor industry was quite different from
that described above, as foreign capital and investment were crucial for the
development of this industry. (Hong 1997, 85)
As a part of the plan to promote the domestic electronics industry, The Korea
Electronics Industry Cooperatives (KEIC) were formed in 1967 by private producers,
under the patronage from the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The KEIC was created
in order to establish an effective communication channel between MTI and the
industry as a whole, rather than with individual producers. (EIAK, 1989, 86-90)
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Although big conglomerates at that time were not involved in the
manufacturing of semiconductors, the entry of Samsung into the electronics industry
in 1969 was an important occurrence for the long-term development of the industry.
Based on its early entry, Samsung managed first to capture the leading position in the
Korean semiconductor industry, and later, in the world market. Other companies
involved in producing electronics strongly opposed the entry of Samsung. All 59
members of the Electronics Industry Cooperative Association unified in an effort to
prevent the state's approval of Samsung's joint projects with Sanyo and NEC. They
were afraid that Samsung, already superior in many terms, would drive them out of
the domestic market. Responding to the efforts of existing firms, the government
placed two preconditions on Samsung’s joint projects:
1) The entire production was to be exported.
2) Items to be produced were restricted.
 (EIAK, 1981)
Samsung's entry into the electronics industry illustrates well the relationships
existing at that time between the state and private manufacturers.  Under pressure
from the opposition, the government placed certain constraints on the company
although it actually approved Samsung’s initiative. In March 1971, both of the
restrictions were abolished.
Summarizing the above it could be said that:
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The creation of the Korean semiconductor industry was initiated as a result of
state efforts to attract foreign investment, and due to the willingness of American and
Japanese companies to develop off-shore production of semiconductor devices.
Based on the outward looking industrialization strategy, the state was
providing various incentives to attract foreign capital. The number of foreign
subsidiaries involved in semiconductor manufacturing was increased substantially due
to the enactment of the Foreign Capital Inducement Law in 1969.  It should be noted,
however, that none of these companies represent major semiconductor manufacturers
firms, today.
Despite of the early entry of Samsung into the electronics industry,
semiconductors started to play an important role in the operations of the company
only after the mid-70s, when Samsung absorbed Korea Semiconductor Inc. In general,
we could say that at this stage the state was reasonably successful in the promotion of
exports and attracting foreign capital.
3.  HCI PROMOTION PERIOD (1973 - 1979)
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Due to the high levels of export dependency of the Korean economy, the
world economic downturn of the 1970s, the dismantling of Bretton Woods system, as
well as the announcement of the Nixon doctrine were quite detrimental. The first Oil
Shock of 1973 worsened the situation further. The policy of the United States
government to withdraw a portion of their troops from the Korea, as well as the
uncertainty brought about by the Nixon doctrine pushed the Korean government to
accelerate the implementation of heavy and chemical industrialization. Unlike Japan
and Taiwan, Korean government undertook a sharp expansionary economic strategy.
In the 1973 ‘State of the Nation Address’ heavy and chemical industry development
was announced by the Korean president as the new direction for economic
development.
The main principles embodied in the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization were stated as
follows:
1) six strategic industries shall be intensively promoted;
2) production shall be geared toward export except a small portion of import
substituting domestic consumption goods; and
3) manufacturing facilities shall be built on a large, internationally competitive
scale
Taking into account its high export potential, the electronics industry was
selected for promotion under the heavy and chemical industrialization program. The
electronics industry during that period grew rapidly and was focused mainly on the
production and export of consumer electronics. Rapid development of the electronics
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industry brought about an increase in demand for semiconductors. The majority of the
domestic demand for semiconductors at that time was met by the Japanese producers.
As Korean consumer electronics were becoming more competitive in the world
market, Korean electronics producers frequently experienced shortages in supply of
semiconductors from Japan. This situation was usually becoming more acute during
the periods of market boom.
Most semiconductor related projects were heavily dependent on both foreign
capital and technologies which were not easy to obtain. This fact created constraints
for Korean companies in exploiting opportunities offered by the latest semiconductor
developments.  Overcoming this structural dependence on imports was one of the
main objectives of the Korean government when promoting the electronics industry
under heavy and chemical industrialization plan. In 1975 the Economic Planning
Board further simplified regulations governing foreign investment to create a
favourable environment for inducement of foreign participation in the technology
sector. A six-year plan was prepared by the Ministry of Trade and Industry to promote
local production of six electronic components, including memory devices and silicon
wafers.
The economic boom of the 1970s began to decline in Korea from the mid
1980s. Taking into account the relatively low technological level of the
semiconductor industry in Korea, most of the above-mentioned projects depended on
the acquisition of foreign technologies. It was extremely difficult to obtain such large
quantities of modern technology as foreign (and especially Japanese) firms were quite
reluctant to transfer it to Korean chipmakers. Despite government plans to attract as
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much foreign investment as possible into the semiconductor industry, it did not allow
more than 50% equity share by the foreign firms, with the result that the level of
foreign investment in Korea changed little.
Despite the vigorous efforts of government and the private sector in
developing domestic semiconductor manufacturing capability there were no
significant changes in the Korean semiconductor industry barring the entry of
Samsung and Goldstar. Priority was placed on the promotion of the heavy and
chemical industries and on the strengthening of country’s export potential. As long as
the exports of electronics were growing, the government did not expend large
amounts of effort in promoting the semiconductor industry despite its original plan to
do so. A major portion of already limited resources were being channeled to the heavy
and chemical industries making further investments into the domestic electronics
industry impossible. The promotion fund, initially planned to be instituted by 1969
upon enactment of the Electronics Industry Promotion Law, was not created until
1979 (EIAK 1989, 174).
“Though the state in this period could be viewed as truly capitalist
developmental state shown in its very strong push for heavy and chemical
industrialization, the achievements in the semiconductor industry were considerably
low. Unlike the Taiwanese state during the same period, the Korean state did not
launch any significant research projects or the construction of semiconductor
facilities, though these were planned as part of heavy and chemical industrialization.
The entry of Samsung and Goldstar in the semiconductor business was a real
breakthrough. These two semiconductor firms, however, largely remained as simple
assemblers, rather than independent manufacturers.  Thus what was actually
16
achieved in the semiconductor industry during the second phase was not only far from
the original plans but also not directly linked to the subsequent development in
Korea”  (Hong 1997, 94).
During the 1970s foreign companies continued to constitute the bulk of
domestic manufacture and export of Korean made semiconductors. The growth
(46.6% average annual growth rate during 1971-79) of the electronics industry was
based mainly on consumer electronics rather than on production of components and
semiconductor devices. As it was mentioned before, the rapid growth of the
electronics sector increased demand for semiconductors and led to the inducement of
large conglomerates such as Samsung and Goldstar into the semiconductor industry.
Since the beginning of 1980s Korean chaebol specializing in electronics production
started to invest heavily in the semiconductor business, and thus, this period is
considered to be a true start of  Korean semiconductor industry.
4. THE TECHNOLOGY LEAPFROGGING EFFECT (1980-87)
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Starting from the end of the 1970s, the Korean economy was in recession and
its GNP growth declined to 2.5% per year from an average of 9.9% from 1962 to
1978. In 1980 the Korean economy growth rate of -4.9% was Korea’s first experience
of negative growth since 1962. Inflation rates increased to 26.4% in the same year.
Trade deficits rose from $1.8 billion in 1978 to $4.4 in 1979 (World Bank 1980). Part
of the reason for this decline in economic performance may be attributed to external
factors, such as the second Oil Shock in 1979, and rising international interest rates.
Internal factors included  the political instability that concluded with the assassination
of President Park in October 1979, (Lee 1980, 63-67) and the tremendous over-
capacity of, and inflation caused by, the heavy and chemical industrialization. (KDI
1981; Haggard and Moon 1990, Woo 1991, 178-82).
In April 1979, President Park's government announced the Comprehensive
Measures for Economic Stabilization (CMES) that differed greatly from the previous
expansionary economic strategy pursued by the government. The main components of
the CMES were the following:
1. "emphasis on comparative advantage rather than industrial targeting and
import substitution;
2. transition toward an economy led by the private sector;
3. a general reduction of state intervention and wider play for market forces;
4. emphasis on social development;
5. vigorous pursuit of macroeconomic stabilization" (Haggard and Moon 1990,
219).
In May 1980, Major General Chun Doo-Whan seized the power in the
country by means of military coup and immediately set about reshuffling the heavy
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and chemical industries.  Those in charge of the creation of CMES continued their
work during the Fifth Republic (1981-87). This gave a new direction to the industrial
policies of the 1980s. Two main objectives were to be reached under the new
industrial policy of the government; liberalization and stabilization. 'Indicative
planning' was to replace active state intervention under these changing conditions.
The new direction of the government policy was also influenced by the
increasing pressure from the developed countries for liberalization of the Korean
market. In response to this pressure in the beginning of 1980s the Korean government
had to introduce new trade and finance liberalization programs. (Yoffie 1983; Odell
1985; Hong 1988).
The Electronics Industry Law was amended in 1981 and a new, long-term
promotion plan for the Electronics Industry was announced by the Ministry of Trade
and Industry. Comparing to previous state devised plans, this plan was less
authoritarian  in its tone and basically represented the government guideline for the
further promotion of the Electronics Industry.
In the meantime, by 1986 Samsung’s memory business appeared to be
becoming quite successful. This fact had a great resonance within the Korean
government and private circles, as it was a clear sign of Korea’s future competitive
advantage in high-tech industries.
“A major difference between the policy measures adopted in this period and
the previous ones lies not in the content, but in the nature and process of developing
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semiconductor policies. In sharp contrast to the promotion efforts up until the 1970s,
the programs in the 1980s were 'indicative' in nature, meaning that the state simply
drew the guidelines rather than actively pushing the policy targets specified in those
plans. In addition, most of these policies were demanded by the private sector rather
than directly initiated by the state. In many cases, the state simply endorsed the
private projects already set in motion” (Hong 1997, 96).
One of the biggest differences between mid 1980s and the preceding period is
that in mid 1980s private businesses took the initiative both in terms of investment
and production. The role of the government in promoting the semiconductor industry
has declined to the degree where some private manufacturers called upon the
government to intervene in the sector (Soh 1997, 234).
In 1981 Samsung Electronics devised a plan to invest some $13 million in
semiconductor mass production facilities. Between 1981 and 1982 Samsung created a
semiconductor research center. In 1982, the former Chairman Lee Byung-chull, and
the founder of the Samsung Group announced that Samsung’s future strategy will be
largely focused on the semiconductor business.
There were several reasons for Samsung to specialize in the production of
DRAM. First of all, DRAM is the most widely used semiconductor device and
consequently has the biggest market share. Secondly, DRAM requires relatively
simple technology allowing its mass production. At the end of 1983 Samsung
developed the 64K DRAM. This was a big technological advancement followed by
many other achievements. In October 1984, Samsung developed a 256K DRAM,
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followed by a 64K SRAM in 1985, a 1M DRAM in 1986, a 256K SRAM in 1986, a 4
M DRAM and a 1M SRAM in 1988, a 16 M DRAM in 1990, a 64M DRAM in 1992,
and a 256M DRAM in 1995. Although the initial technology for production of these
devices was borrowed from abroad we can clearly see that Samsung’s developments
within the semiconductor industry have been astonishing.
Korean semiconductor manufacturers started to increase their foreign
operations and become more internationalized through alliances with foreign
companies. By 1985, all three leading Korean semiconductor producing
conglomerates (Samsung, LG, and Hyundai) established operations in “Silicon
Valley” in the United States with investments totaling $1 billion. The main purpose of
such investments was the acquisition of modern technology, staff training and
coordination of business with overseas partners.  (Business Korea, 1985)
As mentioned above, Korean semiconductor manufacturers were heavily
dependent upon foreign technologies. Therefore, initially between 9% to 23% of total
investment was channeled to the production facilities rather than research and
development. For example, between 1982 and 1986, 53 technology transfer contracts
were signed, from which 48 were related to wafer fabrication. (Park et al. 1987, 281).
The United States provided 36 out of the total 53 (68%) transfers. Japan was the
second main source transferring 13 technologies.  Import of similar technologies by
large Korean semiconductor producers indicates the fact of growing competition
among them as well as lack of government coordination in regards to the imports of
semiconductor related technologies from abroad.
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In 1985 Korean semiconductor producers were severely affected by a volatile
character of the world semiconductor market. The demand and price of memory
devices declined significantly. This forced most of Korean semiconductor companies
to amend their aggressive investment plans.
“Samsung, however, continued its push for the more advanced memory chips
and accelerated the development of more sophisticated DRAMs, though it was the
most severely hit by the price drop. Goldstar took a moderate step, and focused its
production for in-house consumption and the long-term OEM production for Hitachi.
Hyundai had to close down its pilot production facility in Silicon Valley, but
continued investments because it had considerable in-house demand from its
automobile firm. Daewoo also had to scale down its semiconductor project drastically.
When the market recovered in 1986, Daewoo was far behind in the semiconductor
business and never came back to the leading position, Samsung, LG and Hyundai
continued their business, and by 1986, the combined sales of these firms accounted
for more than 90 per cent of Korean wafer fabrication” (Hong 1997, 103).
Nonetheless, during that period South Korea along with other East Asian
nations significantly improved its ranking following the regional pattern of rapid
economic development (see Table 4.1)
Table 4.1 GNP per capita levels and country rankings (US$, current prices) 1962 and 1986
1962 Comparableb 1986 Comparable
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Ranka/
amount
economies Rank/
Amount
Economies
Taiwan 85/
170
Zaire
Congo, PR
38/
3,580
Greece
Malta
South Korea 99/
110
Sudan
Mauritania
44/
2.,372
Surinam
Argentina
Hong Kong 40/
450
Spain
Malta
28/
6,906
Saudi Arabia
Israel
Singapore 38/
490
Greece
Spain
25/
7,411
New Zealand
Bahamas
Notes:
a- Ranking out of 129 countries
b- Comparable refers to countries immediately above and below the four dragons in
the World Bank Atlas listing.
Source: (Hobday M., 1995, p.15)
If we look at the sources of investment into the Korean semiconductor
industry we will observe the following picture: only 20% of the investment was
financed by the industry itself before 1986. The remaining 80% came in the form of
loans from domestic and foreign financial markets. Foreign borrowing accounted for
almost 32% of investments made until 1986 (Park et al. 1987, 278). Consequently,
about 48% of the required investment was provided by the domestic financial market
where the state still played a dominant role. For example, some semiconductor R&D
related projects received funding under government sponsored programs for Special
Research Projects.
Summarizing the above, it could be said that after 1983 large conglomerates
have taken the initiative in expanding production as well as R&D related activities
within the semiconductor industry in Korea. The difference between government
directed development of the semiconductor industry in 1970s and private sector led
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reinforcement of the sector is evident. During this period chaebol participated actively
in the strengthening of the semiconductor industry not due to the incentives offered by
the government, but because of the importance of the industry itself for the future of
these groups.
5.  FROM IMITATION TO INNOVATION (1988 - 1996)
1987 was marked in the history of Korea as another period of political
transition. Roh Tae-woo, a retired military general and a close friend of President
24
Chung became the next president of Korea representing Democratic Justice Party.
There was also growing pressure for democratization from different strata of society
including the labour unions, the opposition political parties, church and students. The
atmosphere was generally tense and further exacerbated by labour unrest and student
demonstrations.
Increasing demands from the United States for the liberalization of trade after
1988, import restriction by advanced countries as well as the appreciation of the
national currency, put Korean businessmen and politicians in a difficult situation.
Starting from the mid 1980s, Korea opened its wine, tobacco and insurance markets
and made an effort toward liberalizing the banking sector. Under pressure from the
United States, Korea was also forced to appreciate its currency from W890 per dollar
in 1986, to about W720 in early 1991. The main reason for this appreciation was to
reduce bilateral trade deficits ($9.9 billion in 1988) between Korea and the United
States.
All of the aforementioned changes resulted in decreased competitiveness of
Korean exports in the world market. For example, the annual growth rate of
electronics  exports decreased from 35.4% in 1988 to just 9.5% in 1989 (Hong 1997,
105).
During this period the chaebol gained more and more independence. The
state could no longer disregard private sector opinion  “given the dominant economic
position of the chaebol, and taking into account that their performance was a crucial
factor contributing to the government’s political legitimacy”. (Soh 1997, 234).
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Since 1988 there was an ever- increasing pressure for more equitable wealth
distribution. Huge profits earned by the chaebol were considered by a majority of the
public to be unfair. During that period government was frequently blamed for
facilitating the expansion of chaebol. As most of the Korean semiconductor industry
was owned by large conglomerates such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai, it became
very difficult for the government to continue to promote it.
There was also an external constraint in the form of US giant electronics
manufacturers. Following Vernon’s product life cycle theory (Vernon 1966, 1971),
US MNCs scattered their production facilities in different countries to increase their
competitiveness in the world markets, and transferred relatively simple technologies.
Based on these technologies, countries like Korea developed quite sophisticated
technologies able to threaten even US semiconductor manufacturers. U.S companies
already had unpleasant experiences with the Japanese leapfrogging and were
undertaking protective measures against transfer of technologies able to undermine
their competitive advantage in the semiconductor sector.
Because of the increasing pressure from the United States, Korea had to
comply with the international norms for intellectual property right protection that
absolutely prohibits reverse engineering by semiconductor firms. Since then, Korean
semiconductor firms have had to deal with numerous lawsuits, mostly by US
semiconductor companies accusing Korean producers of being in violation of patent
rights. The Uruguay Round and the resulting World Trade Organization (WTO) have
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also increased restraints on the Korean government with regard to promoting
particular industries.
The state-private partnership in formulating and implementing science and
technology related policies has significantly increased during that time under the
pressure of the aforementioned constraints. At the same time, the state’s reduced
ability to promote the semiconductor industry was counterbalanced by the growth and
increased strength of chaebol.
Despite of the fact that the private research capabilities were increasing
rapidly during 1980s, still most of the advanced technologies were purchased from
abroad.  Before 1993 R&D investment from private sources was around 14% of total
revenues, and it decreased to less than 10% afterwards. This does not mean that R&D
spending has decreased, on the contrary, the absolute amount of investment by private
companies in research and development in the early 1990s increased significantly.
In 1990 around US$650 million were spent by Samsung on R&D (30%
increase comparing to the previous year). Still this amount was smaller than of
Japanese Matsushita and Sony who spent US$2.3 billion and US$1.1 billion
respectively. (Asian Business, October 1990, pp. 28-29).
Table 5.1 points out the smaller size of Korean electronics companies
comparing to Japanese ones. For example Samsung’s electronics operations are
approximately 25% of Sony’s operations. Nevertheless the sales were frequently
larger comparing to the majority of European and US companies (except IBM). Even
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during the global economic recession in 1992 were quite profitable, while many
Japanese, European and US companies suffered from heavy losses (Hobday 1995,
p.72).
Table 5.1 - Sales of Electronics by South Korean and Japanese conglomerates; 1991
and 1992 (trillion Won, US$ billions)
1991 1992 1992 net profits
Trillion
Won
Billion
US$
Trillion
Won
Billion
US$
Trillion
Won
Billion
US$
Korean
firms
Samsung 6.0 7.9 6.1 7.8 0.72 92
Goldstar 3.8 5.0 3.8 4.8 0.27 34
Daewoo 1.6 2.1 1.7 2.2 0.17 22
Japanese
Firms
Fujitsu - 29.0 - 30.0 - 0
NEC - 31.5 - 29.0 - -100
Sony - 32.0 - 32.5 - 210
Toshiba - 39.0 - 39.0 - 200
Source: (Hobday 1995, p.73)
We should also pay attention to the improved organizational capacity of the
chaebol involved in the semiconductor industry. Utilizing their worldwide presence
and marketing networks, planning and coordination departments of the chaebol were
able to efficiently gather information about the semiconductor market including future
market size, strategies of rival companies and related government policies in different
counties.
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Despite of the fact that the Korean semiconductor manufacturers attained
success in production of memory devices, many structural imbalances still remained
unchanged. For instance, according to 1995 figures, the share of memory products in
total semiconductor production was around 91% and only the remaining 9% was
devoted to non-memory devices. Such concentrated production patterns may be
explained by the shortage of advanced technology and by insufficient development of
related industries involved in production of materials and equipment.
Imbalances of the production structure led to the imbalances in the
export/import pattern. For example, around 90% of Korean semiconductor production
was exported, whereas, almost 70% of domestic semiconductor demand (mainly for
devices of relatively high sophistication) has been met by imports (see table 5.2 and
5.3) (Hong 1997, 113).
Table 5.2 - Domestic Market Sizes and Imports of Semiconductors, (1991-96
$million, %)
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Markets (A) 2,320 2,570 3,080 3,500 4,399 5,300
Markets (B) 1,879 2,107 2,402 2,660 3,035 3,604
B/A (%) 81 82 78 76 69 68
Notes: Estimated figures after 1995                                Source: KSIA (1996),  p.14.
Table 5.3 - Domestic Demands, Production, and Imports of Equipment and Materials,
(1990-95, $million)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
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Equipment
Demand 717 904 874 1,392 1,977 2,174
Production 53 75 94 107 171 391
Import 664 829 780 1,285 1,806 1,783
Materials
Demand 508 591 714 946 1,314 1,872
Production 160 193 239 347 553 876
Import 348 398 475 599 761 996
Notes : Estimated figures after 1995                            Source : KSIA (1996), pp.18-24.
To overcome such weaknesses, Korean companies were trying to devise
various globalization policies. After 1993, the Korean government strongly pushed for
creating industrial alliances with foreign and especially the U.S. semiconductor
companies. One of the reasons for forming such alliances was to press jointly for the
opening of markets in Japan as well as challenging Japan with technological
achievements. As the United States were competitive in cutting the edge technology,
it was thought to combine this advantage with Korea’s manufacturing strength and
highly skilled labour force to counterbalance the structural weaknesses outlined above.
(Kim Wan-Soo, April 1996, 15).
Newly industrialized economies have a slightly different pattern of
specialization comparing to the advanced economies. Catch-up hypothesis
(Abramowitz, 1990) argues that a relatively low income economies may be able to
advance faster than the ones with high income levels since they have an opportunity
to utilize technological innovations developed by the latter. (OECD, 1999, p.30).
When  we look at figures for Korea (see Annex 1), a number of differences are
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obvious. Intensity of Korea’s R&D as well as the number of scientific and technical
articles per unit of GDP is quite low in comparison to other advanced nations. In
general Korea’s innovative activity appears to be lower comparing to the advanced
countries and the transfer and adoption of foreign technology still plays an important
role.
Summarizing the aforesaid, we could say that during this phase the private
sector has been the major driving force of the semiconductor industry in Korea. Smart
decisions taken by Korean private businessmen were the main factors in Korea’s
leapfrogging in  the semiconductor industry. At the same time, it should be noted that
such decisions were supported by the government, which at that time was still in
control of the country’s banking sector.
6.  THE ECONOMIC CRISIS OF 1997 AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
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6.1 The Economic Crisis of 1997
South Korea has transformed itself from the position of being one of the
world’s poorest countries at the end of WWII into the eleventh largest economy in the
world by 1998. It has developed several industries including automobiles,
shipbuilding, and semiconductors. The semiconductor industry has become especially
synonymous with this economic expansion as it saw South Korea build a dominant
position in the memory market. But, in 1996, the collapse of prices within the world
DRAM market seemed to predict the imminent demise of Korea’s economic boom
years.
Korean manufacturers have historically experienced large increases in their
market shares of DRAM. According to 1995 and 1996 statistics, the three major
Korean manufacturers enjoyed at that time more than 30 percent of total
semiconductor production. Although the entire market share was less than that of
Japan, Korea was establishing its position in the market. From 1993 to 1995, the
DRAM market reached its climax with profitability being high. Under such
circumstances, Korean manufacturers invested heavily in order to rapidly expand their
production capacity in an effort to increase their market share in this highly lucrative
market. However, as a result of such hasty expansion in DRAM production capacity
and improvement of production process, toward the end of 1995, the supply of
DRAM came to exceed market demand. New production capacity was downscaled
continuously, but the problem of overproduction was never effectively addressed
throughout 1996 or 1997. As a direct consequence the market price of DRAM
dropped. Although Korean manufacturers continued to improve production
capabilities and strove to win further market share of DRAM, since 1996, both
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earnings and profits were decreasing continuously. Finally, under bitter market
competition, semiconductor manufacturers started to incur losses in 1997.
Due to the expansion of its economy, South Korea has suffered from a
situation of chronic excess capacity, not only in the semiconductor industry but also in
automobiles and other products. Companies that could not make adequate returns on
their heavy investments began to default on loan repayments, consequently, foreign
investors lost confidence. Finally, the Won came under attack ending Korea’s years of
market boom.
Like Japan, South Korea’s banks became over-burdened with bad debts
during Korea’s rapid economic expansion and many of the bank’s assets were held in
the form of stocks or real estate rather than in hard currency. Nevertheless, there are
some significant differences between South Korea and Japan. Japan had very small
amount of foreign debt, especially in dollars. On the contrary, while Japan was
running large trade surpluses in years when the economy was booming, it was able to
amass significant holdings of foreign currency. In comparison with Japan, Korea had
a very large level of foreign debt and relatively low foreign capital reserves.
Many of Korea’s banking institutions may be classed as “merchant” banks.
They differ greatly from the kind of merchant banks which may be found in the
United States. U.S merchant banks specialize primarily in loans to businesses,
whereas, the Korean “merchant” banks specialize in short-term loans. Many of these
banks were established in 1972 in an effort by Korean government to draw money
from Korea’s illegal ‘curb’ money markets to legitimate banking institutions within
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government control. Many of these “merchant” banks took on short-term loans from
international money markets to lend to their customers, taking advantage of
favourable exchange rates. The problem occurred when the customers started to
default. The merchant banks had insufficient reserves to pay back their offshore loans.
At the same time, there was an unusual problem with credit checking, “cronyism” and
other related issues in many Asian countries.
For several weeks during 1997, the South Korean government tried to survive
without requesting help from the IMF. But finally, in December, an agreement was
reached for $57 billion dollars of IMF loans to be paid to Korea. The won was
depreciated by 40.0% against the U.S. dollar, and Korea finally had to face the reality
of its situation. The IMF stand-by agreement included clauses that stipulated that the
government must let banks fail rather than bailing them out, and financial markets
must be thrown open to foreign investment. Other significant weaknesses brought to
public attention by the crisis included unbelievably high debt/equity ratios, massive
foreign borrowing and the lack of discipline within the financial sector.
“Since the typhoon of the International Monetary Fund hit the South Korean
Peninsula, the semiconductor industry in Korea has been among the most seriously
affected industries. As a result, the export of Korean semiconductors in 1998 fell to
$13.5 billion, 5% lower than the same period in 1997” (H.Y. Kim, 1999).
Due to the terms and requests of the IMF stand-by agreement, the Korean
government had to suppress funding to the semiconductor and automobile industries.
As a result, Hyundai Electronics refused to make a planned investment in Scotland,
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UK and LG Semiconductor postponed indefinitely a similar investment project in
Wales, UK.
  
As a next step, the government, influenced by the IMF, pushed Hyundai
Semiconductor to merge quickly with LG Semiconductor. This merger in-turn
delayed investment into a new facility for the development and production of 256 Mb
DRAM, until the merger was complete.
Hyundai and LG negotiations regarding the terms and conditions of this
merger proved to be time consuming. In the meantime, at the end of 1998, Samsung
announced that it was going to complete its ninth fabrication facility for 64 Mb
DRAM by the first half of 1999. This would allow Samsung to keep its status of being
number one producer in the world memory device market.
The final decision regarding the merger of Hyundai Semiconductor with LG
Semiconductor was taken at the end of 1998. According to U.S. consulting firm,
Arthur D. Little, Hyundai was given the controlling stake of the merger. As a result of
this merger Hyundai becomes the second largest company in the world DRAM
market. By means of this merger, the Korean government and the industry authority
assert that up to $2.5 billion of duplicated investment on R&D, royalties and expenses
for patents may be saved.
The financial crisis of 1997 caused the worst recession in Korea since the
postwar era and had a devastating impact on the economy of the country. Real GDP
fell from  5% to 10% before crisis to -5.8% in 1998.  Unemployment increased from
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pre-crisis levels of 2% to 6.8% in 1998 and 8.1% in March 1999. (Joon-Ho Hahm,
Frederic S. Mishkin, 1999).
6.2 The Post Crisis Economic Rebound
Avoiding years of decline and depression, the crisis affected economies of
East and South-East Asia are revealing a striking ability to recover rapidly to the
surprise of international spectators. The semiconductor industry is showing a similar
tendency toward recovery in response to the improving business environment. The
Korean Semiconductor Industry Association (KSIA) estimates that total
semiconductor exports in 1999, including those by assembly and packaging firms,
will reach $18.2 billion, an 11% increase compared to 1998. (H.Y. Kim, 1999).
When the crisis started, foreign investors and businessmen working in East
Asia thought they were the unluckiest people on the planet. One day they benefited
from an economic miracle and the next they fell into a financial crisis, as capricious
foreign capital fled the currency and stock markets, for no obvious reason.
The same foreigners, it emerged, thought in reality they were inefficiently
managed economies with an element of cronyism.  Nevertheless, fortune appears to
be returning to them and the capital is flooding back in. It seems now that affected by
the crisis economies of East and South-East Asia are capable of making rapid
recoveries. Next, probably, will come a gaggle of books and articles promulgating a
new economic miracle.
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In South Korea, for instance, the recovery has been exceptional. Private
economists are forecasting 5 - 8% GDP growth this year. Thailand and Malaysia are
also rebounding quickly. Even Indonesia, which has experienced a 20% drop in GDP,
is expected to return to expansion at the end of 1999. (The Economist, 08/21/99)
Although a relatively quick recovery was forecasted by many economists, its
speed and magnitude has surprised even the optimists. Looking at the change in
sentiment in the stock markets we can see that over one year after the crisis those in
Thailand and Malaysia have almost doubled. The major indexes in Seoul and
Singapore are now above the pre-crisis levels.
Responding to the signs of recovery, consumer spending is growing
everywhere throughout the Asia. As domestic demand increases, so do exports (See
Graph # 1) within the region. Now, export volumes are soaring. The even more
speedy recovery of imports is actually decreasing current-account surpluses, but the
process itself shows us that a recovery of East Asian economies has actually started.
6.3 Asia/Pacific Semiconductor Market, Revenue Forecast, 1999-2003, Millions of Dollars
Graph 1.
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Asia/Pacific semiconductor consumption started gradual recovery during at
the end of 1998. It is expected to have positive growth in 1999 due to increased
production of electronic equipment.
According to Dataquest, the semiconductor revenue in Asia/Pacific will
increase by 14 percent in 1999 and total $35 billion. This follows a 4 percent decline
for 1998. Long-term regional revenue will grow at a 13 percent CAGR (Compounded
Annual Growth Rate) and reach $58 billion by 2003 (Graph 1).
Semiconductor consumption will be based on a stable growth of data
processing and communications applications. Micro components and memory
products will achieve the highest regional growth rates. Communications equipment
will also contribute to the rapid Asia/Pacific semiconductor growth. This application
will support the demand growth for ASICs, DSPs, ASSPs, and analog ICs (Dataquest,
Spring 1999).
6.4 Worldwide Semiconductor Market, Revenue Forecast, 1999-2003, Millions of Dollars
Graph 2.
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Dataquest forecasts that worldwide semiconductor revenue will grow by 12.6
percent in 1999, totaling $153 billion following a 7.5 percent reduction in 1998. By
2003 (Graph 2), worldwide semiconductor revenue is predicted to reach $244 billion,
which is a 12.4 percent compound annual growth rate for the five-year period 1998-
2003.
Growth is estimated to speed up in the year 2000, but is expected not to
exceed 20 percent, due to continued weakness in DRAM pricing through at least the
first half of the year. While economic conditions in Japan continue to be inert, the
worst of the economic crisis in the Asia/Pacific region appears to have been overcome.
Demand in the Asia/Pacific region is expected to partially decrease in 1999, but is
forecasted to hasten considerably in 2000.  (Dataquest, Spring 1999).
After analyzing the worldwide semiconductor market revenue and growth
rate for 1999-2003, I feel it is pertinent to examine the semiconductor forecast for the
same time period including and excluding DRAM (see graph 3).
6.5 Semiconductor Forecast: With and Without DRAM 1999-2003
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This Graph provides a somewhat different forecast. It shows the worldwide
semiconductor market growth rates for 1998 through 2003 for total semiconductor,
DRAM, and non-DRAM semiconductor (that is, total semiconductor, excluding
DRAM). The graph shows a somewhat more stable and flattering long-term
semiconductor market growth rate prediction when DRAM are excluded. It also
highlights the more volatile growth rate forecasted for DRAM  (Dataquest, Spring
1999).
The information we may attain from this graph is important in helping us to
understand the difficulties in predicting Korea’s semiconductor market trends. The
forecast is complicated by the high share of DRAM in total semiconductor production.
6.6 Creation of World Semiconductor Council
One of the important developments in 1999 is the creation by the world’s
major semiconductor manufacturing nations of an organization aimed at lowering
trade and investment barriers against hi-tech commodities.
In a joint statement issued at European headquarters in Belgium, the new
organization, called the “World Semiconductor Council,” (WSC) announced its main
objectives as being “to implement market principles in creating barrier-free trade in
semiconductors by minimizing government intervention and discrimination”. The
WSC stated that it “condemns dumping” and appealed to the governments undertake
effective anti-dumping measures in compliance with the rules and regulations of the
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT).
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“The competitiveness of companies and their products, not the intervention of
government and authorities, should be the principal determinant of industrial success
and trade,” the statement said.
According to the statement by the Korea’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry
and Energy the council will consist of representatives from Korea, the United States
the European Union, Japan and Taiwan. The meetings of the council will be held
annually with the aim to discuss the semiconductor related government policies in the
participating states.
“Until now, international semiconductor meetings focused on regulatory
measures aimed at opening up the Japanese market,” the ministry statement said. “But
the new system follows independent agreements made at the private sector levels
between the United States, Japan the European Union and Korea.”
The founding members of the WSC are the Electronic Industries Association
of Japan, the U.S. Semiconductor Industry Association, the European Electronic
Component Manufacturers Association and the Korea Semiconductor Industry
Association (Korea Herald, 06/11/1999).
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6.7 Korean Semiconductor Market, Revenue Forecast by Korean Semiconductor
Industry Association (KSIA) 1998-1999 (Millions of Dollars)
The semiconductor industry in Korea has been seriously affected by the East
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Even prior to the crisis, the semiconductor industry
had been influenced by the price drop in the world memory market.
As mentioned above, the export of Korean semiconductors in 1998 reached
$13.5 billion, 5% lower than the same period in 1997. Nevertheless, the Korean
Semiconductor Industry Association (KSIA) forecasts that the total exports in 1999,
including those by assembly and packaging firms, will total around $18.2 billion, an
11% increase compared to 1998 (H.Y. Kim, 1999).
Due to the decline in the semiconductor industry and the fall-out from the
IMF sanctions, equipment and materials industries in Korea experienced a serious
slowdown in 1998. There was virtually no new investments made by semiconductor
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manufacturers in Korea in 1998 except the investment made by Samsung at the end of
the year.
“Samsung Electronics is restructuring its business around sophisticated,
value - added areas such as computer central processor units (CPU), application
specific integrated circuits (ASICs), and next generation wireless communications
and multimedia semiconductor products. Samsung is also planning to invest $1.2
billion to expand the company’s monthly production capacity of non-memory
products. With the expanded capacity, Samsung has projected sales of system LSI
chips will increase by at least 44% per annum, from $1.2 billion in 1999 to $1.8
billion in 2000, and further to $2.5 billion by 2001. At the same time Samsung plans
to structure its business around ‘system-on-chip’ devices, microprocessors, and Alpha
CPU, as well as on its mobile communications, multimedia and network products”
(Kim Chang Soo, 1999)
For the Korean semiconductor industry the future looks bright. WSTS
forecasts that the memory market in 1999 will expand by 13% to $14.6 billion, by
26% to $18.4 billion in 2000 and by 28% to $23.7 billion in 2001. The supply is going
to be supported by an estimated 13% to 16% annual growth of a market for personal
computers, as well as by the rapidly growing internet and communication applications.
(H.Y. Kim, 1999)
The September 1999 earthquake in Taiwan will strengthen the position of
Korean semiconductor and LCD manufacturers in the world market.  According to the
Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI), the price rise in computer
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parts is unavoidable due to interruptions in supply of Taiwanese semiconductors and
circuit boards. The price of DRAM was rising even before the earthquake with
Dataquest predicting a 0.4% oversupply. However, after the natural disaster in Taiwan
the world market is going to experience around 5% shortage of memory devices. The
price of TFT/LCD, one of the strategic products for Korean semiconductor producers
is also expected to rise due to the damage to Taiwanese production lines. It will be
also beneficial to the Korean semiconductor companies if the Japanese industries’
strategy to hinder the growth of Korean semiconductor companies through
establishing subsidiaries in Taiwan will fail. (Korea Herald, 14/10/1999)
Worldwide, the beginning of 1999 could be considered as a turning point in
the semiconductor industry after troublesome 1998. According to Dataquest, analog,
discrete, and optical semiconductor suppliers and distributors reported raising demand
and relative price stability. Early second quarter Dataquest reports show raising
demand for the majority of semiconductor products. DRAM price reductions that
began in the second quarter caused an insignificant growth decline in the second
quarter of 1999. The aforementioned price reductions caused concern throughout the
semiconductor industry over revenue expectations for the second half of 1999.
Nevertheless, world semiconductor industry continues to experience a return to
growth in the third quarter of 1999 with a strong fourth quarter forecast. (Dataquest,
Spring 1999)
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7.  POSITIVE SIDES OF THE CRISIS AND IT’S LESSONS
Although in the short term Korea's economy was badly damaged, in the long
run, it will be able to recover, and build a more solid structure due to the following
reasons:
- Korea has adopted restructuring measures towards chaebol.
- Future investment plans will be prepared more carefully.
- The Korean monetary system is facing a rearrangement.
- Financing for Korean manufacturers will not be as easy as before.
- In terms of semiconductors, the country will focus on the domestic
production processes and materials especially for logic devices.
Another positive outcome of the IMF crisis is that most of Japanese DRAM
manufacturers have already decided to drop the production of memory devices, as U.S.
manufacturers did in the past due to low profitability and intensive competition
caused by the excess supply. There was an opinion that Korean DRAM manufacturers
will face the same problems within five years because of strong challenges from the
Taiwan semiconductor industry. However, due to the IMF, Korean manufacturers are
restructuring themselves and are becoming more competitive.
It could be said that the IMF provided the Korean semiconductor industry
with an opportunity to prolong the enjoyment of its leading position in the world
memory market.
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In order to ensure healthy economic environment and stability of the Asian
economies the following lessons should be learned from the crisis of 1997:
- Reforms aimed at allowing market forces to operate freely must be
implemented. Investment, production and export should not be subsidized or
assisted by the state but should instead be governed by market forces.
- Asian economies should not try to achieve economic recovery only
through exports. Subsidies to exports as well government designed export targets
will only further aggravate the existing problems. Government directed lending to
certain companies has already caused over-capacity in several industries,
including semiconductors.
- Any new financing for industry must be commercially feasible and not
government instructed. Loans to businesses must be entirely market-based and not
be below a benchmark rate based on the individual credit-worthiness of a
borrower.  Companies that cannot operate in the free market environment must be
restructured or sold.
Decisive actions are to be taken to improve the quality and transparency of
corporate balance sheets through the adoption of international accounting standards.
The accounting system used should be clear enough to allow effective monitoring of
the  financial performance of a company.
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8.  CONCLUSION
As we observed previously, the role of the state in the development process
of the Korean semiconductor industry has changed with time. The Korean
government which put a lot of efforts into the promotion of heavy and chemical
industrialization in the 1970s was not in a position to offer similar incentives during
the take-off of the domestic semiconductor industry in the beginning of 1980s. This
was caused by structural constraints (discussed in Chapter 5) both in Korea and
abroad. Because of these changes in business and political environment, private firms
decided to enter the risky semiconductor business. In the following development of
the industry, the government and chaebol cooperated actively in elaborating and
implementing the semiconductor related policies.
We can say that the existing economic structure in Korea was not favourable
to innovation in the semiconductor industry. Partly this is because of the nature of
Korean industrialization that was focused on imitation rather than innovation. From
the very beginning it happened to be based on foreign designs and borrowed
technologies. At the same time, it was overstressing the importance of the economies
of scale. In this regard we can recall Alice Amsden stating (Amsden 1989) that that
learning is a new mode of industrialization for the late industrializing countries.
The main question is if Korea is able to change from imitator to innovator.
Starting from the 1970s, the Korean economical structure was very well suited to the
learner’s requirements and mentality. Eventually, a special set of conditions is
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essential for innovation mechanism to start working. The institutional arrangements
that facilitated Korea’s rapid late industrialization based on foreign technologies are
now starting to have negative influence on the advancement of domestic technological
knowledge. (Soh 1997, 259)
Samsung’s example clearly illustrates that Korea is gradually becoming an
innovator in the semiconductor industry. Although skeptics claimed that it lacked the
technological capability to enter and remain competitive in the semiconductor
business, Samsung Electronics has, in only a decade, transformed itself from a mere
producer of discrete devices to the renowned leader in the world memory market.
(Kim Linsu 1997)
Recent developments in Korea indicate major changes in the national
environment. The strong authoritarian bureaucracy of the previous years has been
gradually loosing its power, while private businessmen have started to realize the
necessity to restructure their companies. Still and all, a switch from one system to
another is a quite complicated task to carry out.
South Korea’s admission to the OECD in 1996 concluded 35 years of rapid
economic development. The strong fundamentals conducive to this rise were - export
oriented industrialization, high rates of savings, and investment as well as highly
skilled and educated labour force.  One year later, in 1997, the uncompromising
financial crisis sweeping over entire Asia region has damaged the Korean economy
significantly.
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“Tthe South Korean economy has been shaken to its very core and the ability
to recover to the prosperous levels of the past decades will require more structural
reform. With the rest of Asia recovering and with the re-emergence of the several key
semiconductor markets, conditions in South Korea are improving. However, long-
term growth depends directly on the government’s ability to implement economic
reforms that will bolster the financial sector, improve corporate management
practices and further open the once closed economy to more foreign
investment”.(Cahners In-Stat Group 1999)
Graph 5 shows South Korea’s GDP rates/forecast according to Cahners In-Stat Group
South Korea: Real GDP Growth (Annual % Change)
Source: 1999 Cahners In-Stat Group – S19903SF
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Many of East Asian countries consider the on-going recovery as a return to
the phenomenal growth rates they enjoyed in early 1990s (see annexes No.2 and
No.3). Eventually such speedy growth will be much harder to achieve now than it was
in the past. Asian economies are more developed now than they were in the beginning
of their developmental take-off. They will retain the advantages of youth for many
years yet, but growth will depend less on injecting more people and capital, and more
on something rather harder - raising productivity. That demands comprehensive
reforms. If Asian governments will find themselves unable to implement their
promised reforms, they will fail to lay the groundwork for more efficient use of
capital and for faster growth in productivity not only in the semiconductor industry
but across the entire economies of their respective countries.
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Annex I
Semiconductor Classification by Device
Semiconductors
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Specific Devices
Representative End-Users
Source: Soh Changrok, September 1997
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Annex II Income and Technological Performance in OECD countries, 19951
Country Income level, 1996 In
dicators of scientific and technological performance
GDP per head Gross
Domestic
Researchers Scientific Government Government Business Technological Technologic
al
of population Expenditure per 10,000 and technical financed R&D financing expenditure strength intensity,
as a % of OECD On R&D labour force articles as a % of
GDP
of R&D on R&D as
a %
per US$ of
R&D
19954
average as a % of GDP 1995 per unit 1995 as a % of total of business 19953
1995 of GDP R&D, 1995 GDP, 1995
19952
United States 140 2.6 74 20 0.9 34.6 2.1 410 10.4
Norway 128 1.7 73 21 0.8 43.5 1.4 .. ..
Switzerland 126 2.7 46 37 0.8 28.4 2.2 .. ..
Japan 121 2.8 83 15 0.6 20.9 2.2 354 10.6
Iceland 118 1.5 72 23 0.9 62.9 0.8 .. ..
Denmark 117 1.8 57 31 0.7 39.2 1.7 87 1.6
Canada 114 1.7 53 25 0.6 33.7 1.4 203 3.3
Belgium 112 1.6 53 20 0.5 26.4 1.4 111 1.8
Austria 111 1.5 34 18 0.8 47.6 1.1 125 1.9
Australia 107 1.6 64 24 0.8 47.5 0.9 .. ..
Germany 107 2.3 58 21 0.8 37 1.9 215 5.0
Netherlands 106 2.0 46 31 0.9 42.1 1.3 170 3.5
France 103 2.3 60 20 1.0 42.3 1.9 115 2.7
Italy 102 1.1 33 13 0.5 46.2 0.8 101 1.0
Sweden 100 3.6 68 41 1.0 33 3.9 147 5.3
United Kingdom 98 2.1 52 29 0.7 33.3 1.8 160 3.2
Finland 96 2.3 61 35 0.9 35.1 2.2 114 2.7
Ireland 92 1.4 59 16 0.3 22.6 1.4 69 1.0
New Zealand 88 1.0 35 29 0.6 52.3 0.3 .. ..
Spain 77 0.9 30 16 0.4 43.6 0.5 21 0.2
Korea 72 2.7 48 5 .. 19 2.3 25 0.7
Portugal 70 0.6 24 7 0.4 65.2 0.2 8 0.0
Greece 67 0.5 20 16 0.2 46.9 0.2 .. ..
Czech Republic 64 1.2 23 15 0.4 35.5 0.9 .. ..
Hungary 47 0.8 26 20 0.4 47.9 0.4 115 0.7
Mexico 36 0.3 6 2 0.2 66.2 0.1 15 0.0
Poland 35 0.7 29 17 .. 64.7 0.4 .. ..
Turkey 30 0.4 7 4 0.2 64.5 0.1 .. ..
1. Or latest available year.
2. Scientific and technological articles per billion of US$ of GDP. See National Science Foundation (1988).
3. Technological strength is determined by multiplying the number of patents with an index of their impact. This index measures how frequently a country’s recent patents are cited by all of a current year’s patents. The patents refer those
granted at the US Patent Office. Data are from CHI research.
4. Technology intensity compares the technological strength of a country with its GDP expressed in PPP$. See OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 1998 for details. Source: OECD calculations on the basis of the MSTI database.
CHI Research, National Science Foundation (1998), and OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 1998.
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Annex III
Average annual rates of growth of real GNP (selected years).
Country/group 1960-69 1970-79 1980-88 1988 1991 1992 1993a 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Four NIEs
Hong Kong 10.0 9.4 8.0 10.5 3.9 5.2 5.6 12.9 6.1 10.8 11.7 -4.8
South Korea 7.7 9.5 8.7 15.9 8.4 5.5 6.3 14.4 19.7 6.4 -8.7 9.5
Singapore 8.9 9.5 7.0 10.0 6.7 5.6 6.5 22.4 19.7 10.6 2.1 6.0
Taiwan 9.5 10.2 7.5 9.5 7.0 6.7 n/a 8.1 7.9 4.6 4.0 0.1
ASEAN-4
Indonesia 3.4 7.8 5.8 7.5 7.0 5.5 6.0 12.0 14.1 12.4 -5.3 3.0
Malaysia 6.5 8.1 5.3 6.6 8.6 8.5 8.0 14.1 19.2 13.8 -1.0 0.2
Philippines 3.0 6.3 1.6 6.4 0.0 3.3 1.5 18.5 15.6 12.2 -1.2 7.8
Thailand 8.3 7.4 5.6 7.1 7.9 7.5 7.8 15.2 16.7 7.7 -14.9 7.7
Other Asia
China 2.9 7.5 9.2 10.2 4.6 12.0 10.0 -8.7 30.0 17.3 10.1 -1.7
Developed
Canada 5.7 4.7 3.1 4.3 -0.2 0.3 2.8 -1.1 4.9 4.9 2.7 -1.6
Japan 10.9 5.2 5.3 5.1 3.1 0.9 2.4 9.7 9.6 -10.6 -8.7 14.8
United States 4.1 2.8 2.6 3.6 0.4 2.2 2.5 5.8 4.7 5.1 5.8 -3.7
a – official 1992 estimates
Updated from  Michael Hobday, 1995, p.14. (Source for all economies 1994-1998  - APEC Secretariat Web-site: www.apecsec.org.sg/member/gdp.html)
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Annex IV APEC Economies’ GDP figures (1989 – 1998)
Current Price GDP
(US$ billion)
1989 (a) 1990 (a) 1991 (a) 1992 (a) 1993 (b) 1994 (b) 1995 (b) 1996 (b) 1997 (b) 1998 (b)
Australia 292 296 283 300 285 327 353 395 394 394
Brunei Darussalam 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 4 4 5 5 5 5
Canada 575 574 561 564 553 547 574 602 618 608
Chile 29 30 32 35 44 51 65 69 77 77
China 356 370 399 452 599 547 711 834 918 902
Hong Kong, China 69 72 75 79 116 131 139 154 172 163.8
Indonesia 99 106 113 121 158 177 202 227 215 221.5
Japan 2817 2952 3079 3120 4275 4689 5137 4595 4193 4812.1
Korea 232 254 277 291 333 381 456 485 443 485.2
Malaysia 39 43 47 50 64 73 87 99 98 98.2
Mexico 234 244 253 260 403 421 286 329 403 348.6
New Zealand 44 44 43 43 44 51 60 66 65 59.5
Papua New Guinea 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4.2
Peru n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 50 59 61 65 63.7
Philippines 43 44 44 44 54 64 74 83 82 88.4
Russian n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 173 279 348 434 450 394.9
Singapore 34 37 39 41 58 71 85 94 96 101.8
Chinese Taipei 153 161 173 183 223 241 260 272 283 283.4
Thailand 73 80 93 100 125 144 168 181 154 165.8
USA 5478 5522 5458 5637 6553 6936 7265 7636 8080 7783
Vietnam n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. 13 16 20 23 26 24
(a) figures are expressed in 1990 prices and exchange rates
(b) figures are expressed in 1997 prices and exchange rates
Source: The APEC Region Trade and Investment, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/member/gdp.html
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List of Acronyms
ASICs Application Specific Integrated Circuits
ASSPs Application Specific Standard Products
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CAGR Compounded Annual Growth Rate
CMES Comprehensive Measures for Economic Stabilization
CPU Central Processing Unit
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory
DSP Digital Speech Products
EIAK Electronics Industry Association of Korea
EPB Economic Planning Board
GATT General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HCI Heavy and Chemical Industries
IC Integrated Circuit
IMF International Monetary Fund
KDI Korea Development Institute
KEIC Korea Electronics Industry Cooperatives
KSIA Korea Semiconductor Industry Association
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LSI Large Scale Integration
MAFEZ Masan Free Export Zone
MNC Multinational Corporation
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer
R&D Research and Development
SRAM Static Random Access Memory
WSC World Semiconductor Council
WSTS World Semiconductor Trade Statistics
WTO World Trade Organization
